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Terry Copp

T

he series of disasters which marked the
opening months of the war with Japan were
unprecedented and disorienting giving rise to
conspiracy theories and the search for scape
goats. The destruction of the battleships at Pearl
Harbour initially eclipsed all other catastrophes
but even as President Roosevelt's opponents in
Congress demanded an inquiry and circulated
stories about how he had lured the Japanese
into war, those who could t h i n k clearly
recognized that the surprise attack, by uniting
the American people behind the war, was really
a defeat for Japan.' When Hitler, in one of his
many blunders, declared war on the United
States the Pacific war was merged into the larger
struggle. Since the US Navy's aircraft carriers
were undamaged, its submarine arm intact, and
the base at Pearl Harbor operational, the Chief
of the General Staff, General George C. Marshall,
was able to expand the American war effort
without reversing the Europe-first policy to
which both he and President Roosevelt were
committed.
If America emerged from the tragedy of Pearl
Harbor stronger in every way that mattered the
same could not be said for the British Empire
and its Commonwealth. The sinking of the
Prince of Wales and the Repulse on 10 December
1941, the surrender of Hong Kong on 25
December and the collapse of resistance in
Malaya and Singapore in early 1942 marked the
beginning of the end of the British Empire in
the Far East. In 90 days forces under British
command had lost two battleships, 200 aircraft
and 166,000 men, 130,000 of whom were taken
prisoner. The Empire had been humiliated,
particularly in Malaya and Singapore, when "a
garrison that outnumbered the attackers by
more than five to two... was hounded to utter
destruction in seventy days."2

The campaign in Malaya and the fall of
Singapore have been the subject of many books
and much name-calling. The best accounts
clearly establish that the causes of the collapse
were rooted in the Empire's failure to enlist,
equip and train armed forces capable of carrying
out the obligations and strategic commitments
considered vital in London. Unfortunately,
British commanders, in seeking to explain
o p e r a t i o n a l failure, chose to single out
Commonwealth and Indian forces for criticism.3
The Australians in Singapore and the Canadians
in Hong Kong bore the brunt of this criticism
which was renewed in the early 1990s with the
release of the uncensored versions of Lord
Wavell's Report on Operations in Malaya and
Singapore, June 19424 and Major-General C.
Maltby's official account of the defence of Hong
Kong.5
The controversies stirred up by these
documents did not serve the interests of the
Empire-Commonwealth in the 1940s and did
nothing to encourage Australians or Canadians
to cherish ties with Britain in the 1990s, but
they have been a boon for historians who wish
to know more about what happened in 1941. In
the last days before the surrender of Hong Kong
orders were given to destroy documents,
including message logs and War Diaries, which
might provide assistance to the enemy. Thus the
basic record of events was lost. But once settled
in prisoner of war camps the senior British staff
officers began to compile, "from memory," not
only a narrative but a listing of events which was
declared to be "morally the war diary of Fortress
Headquarters." 6
It did not take long for rumours to spread
about this endeavour and Canadian officers,
convinced they and their troops would be made
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scapegoats, responded. Major George Trist, who
served as adjutant of the Winnipeg Grenadiers,
wrote his Report on the Part Played by the
Winnipeg Grenadiers in the Defence of Hong
Kong in April 1942 while he was at North Point
Camp. The report begins:
Two important factors have decided me to
compile this report without further delay and
while still a prisoner of war... The first and most
urgent one is the necessity for a very accurate
recording of events as they occurred. This would
not have so important but for the fact that it has
become very evident that we (The Canadian
Forces) are being blamed by the Imperial troops
for the fall of Hong Kong. And while it is not
definitely known that the Imperial Staff will
adopt this attitude in their official report every
precaution must be taken to ensure that any
attempt to make "C" Force the scape goat is
adequately challenged by a submission of the
facts while they are still fresh in the memory.7

The Royal Rifles compiled even more extensive
accounts of their activities8 and it is this kind of
material t h a t the h i s t o r i a n m u s t u s e in
reconstructing the events of December 1941. It
is therefore necessary to proceed carefully. It is
not difficult to ask questions about the defence
of Hong Kong it is just answers that are hard to
come by.
In 1941 the Crown Colony of Hong Kong,
consisting of the island and the leased territories,
had a population of 1.7 million about half of
whom were recent refugees from the war in
China. The population of European descent did
not exceed 25,000, including the military
garrison. The cities of Victoria and Kowloon
accounted for most of this total but as many as
150,000 lived afloat on J u n k s and Sampans.
The Japanese had conquered the adjacent area
of mainland China in October 1938 9 and by
December 1941 the Japanese 23rd Army in
South China deployed four divisions with
substantial artillery as well as air and naval
units. 10
The British government did not believe that
Hong Kong could survive a determined Japanese
attack and began evacuating European women
and children in 1940. This decision, coupled
with other problems in administering a colony
deluged with refugees, led to charges of
favouritism and corruption and, by the fall of
1 9 4 1 , Hong Kong was a deeply divided
community. The Chinese population felt little

attachment to the colonial authorities though
they were at least preferable to the Japanese. 11
Compulsory military service was introduced
for male British subjects, of European birth,
while those of Portuguese extraction were
allowed to volunteer. By 1941 the Hong Kong
Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC) consisted of
seven infantry companies, five artillery batteries,
five machine gun companies and an armoured
car platoon.12 The Hong Kong "volunteers" were
to supplement the garrison of four infantry
battalions; the 2nd Royal Scots, the 1st
Middlesex (MG) and two Indian Army units 2/
14 Punjabs and 5/7 Rajputs. Coastal Regiments
of the Royal Artillery manned 29 guns, mostly
6-inch howitzers. The air resources, three
Vildebeeste Torpedo Bombers and two Walrus
amphibians were of no consequence. Three of
the four destroyers based on Hong Kong were
ordered to sea before 7 December leaving HMS
Thracian plus four gunboats and eight motor
torpedo boats. 13
The basic plan for the defence of Hong Kong
had been developed in 1937. A defensive line
including pillboxes was built from Gin Drinkers
Bay to Tide Cove, the narrowest, point on the
Kowloon p e n i n s u l a . After t h e J a p a n e s e
occupation of Canton plans were changed: the
Gin Drinkers line was abandoned. No attempt
would be made to defend the mainland. 14
Giving up the mainland and defending the
Island made neither political nor military sense.
There was less than a kilometreseparating
Kowloon from Victoria and the main water
reservoirs were in the New Territories. Hong
Kong had 130 days reserve of food but there
were bound to be serious water shortages in any
protracted siege.15 It was these difficulties that
led Major-General Edward Grassett to propose
obtaining additional troops from Canada and as
soon as the new commander, Major-General
C.M. Maltby, was informed that "C" Force would
be sent to Hong Kong he resurrected the 1938
plan and began to restore the Gin Drinkers line,
[see map Hong Kong: The Mainland]
Maltby, an officer of the Indian Army who
had commanded the Staff College at Quetta
arrived in Hong Kong in July 1941 during the
middle of a local crisis provoked by Japanese
attacks on Hong Kong-based boats and the
international crisis provoked by J a p a n ' s
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occupation of southern Indo-China. Maltby and
the colony's governor, Sir Mark Young, do not
seem to have acted with any sense of urgency,
apparently convinced that war with Japan was
unlikely and that Japanese troops were poorly
trained. Maltby spoke to the Canadian officers
shortly after their arrival and according to
George Trist told them:
the Japanese had only about 5,000 troops with
very little artillery support... their troops were
ill-equipped and not used to night fighting... their
aircraft were for the most part obsolete and their
pilots very mediocre, [they were] unable to do
dive bombing due to poor eyesight.16

Brigadier C. Wallis, a British Indian Army officer,
who commanded the Mainland Brigade, told an
interviewer that,
The lack of any real belief that war was pending
had astonished him. Col. Newnham GSOl,
always regarded suggestions that the Japanese
might be a serious threat as unpatriotic or even
insubordinate. Brig. Wallis had tried to introduce
into mainland schemes, tactics which would
prepare for an enemy attack other than by the
expected main road method. He spoke of the
difficulty of getting the civil administration to
release civilian property for the building of MG
emplacements etc. The administration felt that
this would be done during a "precautionary
stage" which actually of course did not
materialize.17
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2001

These post-conflict accounts are supported by
the contemporary intelligence reports from Hong
Kong which reflect little concern with military
action against the colony and an optimistic view
of events in Japan. The November summary, for
example, doubted that Japanese preparations
were more than a "general tightening up." 18
Before condemning Maltby and his staff for
what proved to be uninformed views bolstered
by racist stereotypes it would be well to try and
u n d e r s t a n d why B r i t i s h a n d A m e r i c a n
commanders consistently u n d e r r a t e d the
military effectiveness of the Japanese forces and
doubted their willingness to begin a war against
a major military power. The Japanese army had
been involved in a military campaign to conquer
China since 1938. Three years later the "China
incident", as the Japanese called it, was far from
over. Chaing Kai-Shek's nationalist army was
intact and apparently growing in strength. The
Japanese puppet government of Wang-Ching-Wei
had lost what little credibility it had begun with.
The failure to crush Chinese resistance, despite
deploying 1.5 million troops on the mainland,
did not suggest great military prowess.
More important in western eyes was the
record of the Japanese army in clashes with the
Soviets. The Red Army had crushed Japanese
7
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advances in 1938 and again in 1939 when, under
the command of General Georgi Zhukov, the
Soviets humiliated the Japanese army inflicting
11,000 casualties on a force of 15,000. These
defeats had led to some reorganization of the
Japanese army, especially the development of
a r m o u r e d u n i t s , b u t little h a d b e e n
accomplished by the fall of 1941.19

Asia. Maltby ordered that certain precautionary
measures be taken but as late as 7 December
he was reassuring London that reports of
Japanese strength in the Canton area were
"deliberately fostered by the Japanese who, to
judge from the defensive preparations around
Canton and in the frontier area appeared
distinctly nervous of being attacked." 22

Supplementing this general view of the poor
performance of the Japanese army was an
exaggerated belief in the power of Chiang KaiShek's forces. Much was made of the presence
of three Chinese "armies" to the west of Canton
and both the War Office and General Maltby seem
to have believed that these forces would attack
the Japanese and come to the relief of Hong
Kong. 20 Maltby, like his c o u n t e r p a r t s in
Singapore and Manila, was also unimpressed
with the Japanese air arm which was said to be
poorly trained and equipped with obsolete
aircraft. It is not easy to understand how such a
view remained dominant in military intelligence
circles when the 'Zero' had been in operational
use in China for over a year. One can only note
that British intelligence on the Japanese armed
forces was full of assumptions and little hard
evidence.21

These extraordinary misjudgements may
account for the lack of urgency in the final
preparations for the defence of Hong Kong. When
Maltby reactivated the 1938 defence plan the Gin
Drinkers line had fallen into disrepair and
"much work was needed to make the line fully
operational." 23 The Shing Mun Redoubt, a
12-acre network of pillboxes, concrete fire
trenches, underground shelters and an artillery
observation post, which overlooked both roads
to Kowloon, was restored to use but the troops
who would occupy it were held in training camps
until mid-November pending the arrival of the
Canadians. 24

By the end of November 1941 the
international press was freely speculating about
an imminent Japanese offensive in South East
8
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If their was little sense of urgency in Hong
Kong there was even less in London where
Churchill and the War Office insisted that war
with Japan was unlikely. As late as 16 November
the British War Cabinet continued to maintain
that, "in the absence of extreme danger in the
Far East," priority should be given to the Middle
East where General Auchinleck's offensive was
4
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about to begin. At that meeting Churchill insisted
"that it would be a grave strategic error to move
forces to the Far East." 25
When Churchill made this comment the War
Cabinet was debating the reinforcement of
Malaya and Singapore, Hong Kong was not
mentioned, but military preparations in that
colony were severely hampered by the generally
low priority assigned to all Far Eastern matters.
However, two issues of some importance to the
defence of the colony could have been resolved
without any impact upon the campaign in North
Africa. The first was the recruiting of a battalion
of Chinese volunteers to serve under British
officers. Authority was not sought until October
1941 and then took one month to grant. Recruits
were required to be 5' 7" tall which eliminated
most of the first 600 volunteers who appeared. 26
The second problem was the shortage of
ammunition for the 2" and 3" mortars which was
so grave that preliminary firing "could seldom
be carried out,"27 so neither practice nor the
registration of targets was possible. The arrival
of the Canadians, who had been informed that
they would be supplied with mortar bombs in
Hong Kong, meant that the available supply had
Right & Below: Troops of "C" Force en route to the Sham
Shui Po Barracks, located on the mainland of Hong Kong,
16 November 1941.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2001
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to be spread even more thinly. As General Maltby
was to note in his Dispatch, mortar ammunition
"in any appreciable quantity did not arrive until
November and then only 70 rounds per battalion
for war and practice... the two inch mortar
situation was worse."28
The arrival of the Canadians allowed Maltby
to begin implementing his defence plans and the
three battalions of the "Mainland Brigade" under
Brigadier C. Wallis moved to the Gin Drinkers
Line to begin digging in and wiring the positions.
The Canadians were to serve together on Hong
Kong Island under their own commander, Brig.
J o h n Lawson, who was also nominally in
command of the 1st Middlesex Regiment, a
machine gun battalion which was committed to
manning 72 concrete pillboxes ringing the
island. The two Canadian battalions were
quartered at the barracks in Kowloon on the
mainland and carried out "two 48 hour manning
exercises" of designated areas on the island. 29
Were there alternatives to this defensive
scheme which were within the resources and
capacities of the garrison? It appears that
Maltby's dispositions suffer from the classic
problem of a perimeter defence where one is
10
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weak everywhere. It is not second guessing to
suggest that a defensive plan which places all
battalions in line and provides a single company
as a brigade reserve would not have won high
marks at the Quetta Staff College which General
Maltby directed. Is there an element of fatalism
about these dispositions? Or are we examining
preparations for a battle which Maltby was
convinced would never take place?
For the people and garrison of the colony
war began at 0800 hours on 8 December several
hours later than Pearl Harbor and the Japanese
landings in Malaya. The first air attack destroyed
the five RAF aircraft which had been ordered
not to take off unless the opportunity to attack
a capital ship or a cruiser developed. 30 The
Japanese ground attack was quickly underway
with three infantry regiments, nine battalions,
supported by three mountain artillery battalions,
advancing on a broad front. Demolitions and
rear guard "commando" actions imposed only
minor delays on the Japanese and by dawn on
9 December they were within sight of the main
British defences. Brig. Wallis felt obliged to
commit his only reserve to plug a gap in the line
so the thinly held perimeter was all that stood
in the way of the Japanese. 31
6
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It may be important to note that information
about the Chinese nationalist intentions reached
Maltby during the first day. The British military
mission in Chungking reported that operations
to relieve Hong Kong would begin on 1 January
though a postponement to 10 January might be
necessary. 32 Whatever Maltby may have thought
of the Chinese role before 9 December he must
have now realized that it could have little
influence on the struggle to defend Hong Kong.
Everything now depended upon holding the
Gin Drinkers Line but the key position, the Shing
Mun Redoubt, fell to an improvised night attack
by a Japanese infantry battalion. The Japanese
evidence mentions stubborn resistance but it is
evident that the silent night attack achieved
surprise and the position was quickly occupied.
The comment of one Royal Scots officer on the
events of the night may be quoted:
I never met anyone who knew the redoubt.. .who
believed it would be held with a force of less
than one company. During the hours of
darkness.. .it was without any value whatsoever a large isolated position spread across a hillside,
its total armament a few widely-separated
machine guns laid to fire along fixed lines.33

These words were of course written in hindsight
but it is not easy to understand how Brigadier
Wallis imagined a single, widely-dispersed
platoon could resist a night attack. Wallis himself
claimed, in a postwar interview, that "he had
continually pointed out the need for reserve
forces" but had been overruled. 34
Wallis "urged the Commanding Officer of the
Royal Scots to counterattack at first light."35 How
this was to be accomplished with a half-strength
company previously committed to its own sector
was not clear and the CO declined to carry out
the Brigadier's request. Maltby then ordered a
company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers to the
mainland to serve as a brigade reserve. 36 But
the loss of the redoubt seems to have shaken
his confidence and he issued a warning order to
prepare for the evacuation of the mainland at
1000 hours on 10 December. The Japanese
maintained pressure on the British forces and
air attacks "continued spasmodically throughout
the day" but the defences were still intact when
Maltby decided to "evacuate the Mainland except
for the Devil's Peak position..." under cover of
darkness that night.37

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2001

Something very close to panic set in during
the evacuation, not among the troops or even
the civilian p o p u l a t i o n b u t a t F o r t r e s s
Headquarters. When evacuation was ordered the
plan was to hold the Devil's Peak and two
companies of the Rajputs moved to the Ma Lau
Tong position without interference. The Royal
Scots, with the Winnipeg company, the Punjab
battalion and the balance of the Rajputs
withdrew together with the field artillery and
armoured cars. While this retreat to the island
was underway the J a p a n e s e army's 229th
Regiment moved cautiously forward making
contact with the Rajputs at 1300 hours on 12
December. The Japanese, encouraged by the
ease with which they had overcome the main
defensive line, attacked the Rajputs without
prearranged artillery support and were beaten
off with some of the heaviest casualties of the
campaign.38
Maltby's response to this was to withdraw
the Rajputs to the Hai Wan position shortening
the line and allowing him to bring one Rajput
company and the field artillery to the island.
These moves were safely accomplished during
the night of 12/13 December but Maltby now
decided to evacuate the remaining Rajputs dugin at Devil's Peak despite Brig. Wallis' protests. 39
In his Dispatch Maltby stated "that it was more
important to have the Rajputs together to hold
its sector of the Island defences"40 than to control
Devil's Peak, a judgement which few observers
would share.
What comments may reasonably be offered
about the first stage of the defence of Hong Kong?
The British official historian noted that "judged
by hopes and expectations the withdrawal was
premature." 41 C.P. Stacey, the Canadian official
historian wrote "the defence of Hong Kong had
begun very badly."42 Neither author developed
any specific critique of the plans or their
execution. General Maltby, who was well aware
that his actions would be scrutinized, placed a
good deal of the blame on the Royal Scots whose
fighting qualities had "not inspired him."
Needless to say, he offered no comment on his
own performance.
The most likely explanation for Maltby's
behaviour during the five days of the mainland
battle is that he assumed the real battle for Hong
Kong would be fought in defence of the island
and that he would need all available troops for
11
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that task. How precisely he proposed to defend
the island is another matter which we shall
shortly examine. We must also note the impact
of events in the wider world. By 11 December
the garrison of Hong Kong knew of the fate of
the American fleet and that night the BBC
announced the sinking of the Prince of Wales
and the Repulse. Any chance of assistance for
Hong Kong had disappeared.
The J a p a n e s e commander, LieutenantGeneral Takashi Saki heard the same news and,
given the haste of the British retreat to the island,
assumed that the enemy might now capitulate.
The text of the J a p a n e s e ultimatum of 13
December 1941 read:
Since our troops have joined battle I have gained
possession of the Kowloon Peninsula despite the
good fighting qualities of your men, and my
Artillery and Air Force, which are ready to crush
all parts of the Island, now await my order. Your
Excellency can see what will happen to the Island
and I cannot keep silent about it. You have all
done your duty in defending Hong Kong so far,
but the result of the coming battle is plain, and
further resistance will lead to the annihilation
of a million good citizens and to such sadness
as I can hardly bear to see. If Your Excellency
would accept an offer to start negotiations for

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol10/iss4/2

the surrender of Hong Kong under certain
conditions, it will be honourable. If not, I,
'repressing my tears', am obliged to take action
to overpower your forces.43

This was a political rather than a military
question and Sir Mark Young, the Governor of
the Colony replied "acknowledging the spirit in
which this communication is made but he is
unable to in any circumstances to hold any
meeting or parley on the subject of the surrender
of Hong Kong." For public consumption a more
strident reply claiming the colony "was strong
enough to resist all attempts at invasion"44 was
issued though its is unlikely anyone believed it.
The stage was therefore set for the invasion
of the island. Maltby's dispositions to meet the
expected attack are illustrated in the map Hong
Kong: Troop Positions. Once again it is
impossible to ignore the very serious problems
apparent in these arrangements. Maltby placed
his four full strength infantry battalions plus the
Hong Kong volunteers in an extended perimeter
defence designating the Royal Scots, who had
lost a quarter of their rifle strength and a good
deal of their confidence, as fortress reserve. He
divided the island into two sectors, and insisted
on breaking up "C" Force, assigning the Royal

8
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A view across the Lye Mun Passage. The photo, taken from the Lye Mun Barracks (ruins visible in foreground) shows
the short distance to the mainland which the Japanese crossed on 18 December 1941. Devil's Peak is visible at the right
edge of the photograph taken in September 1945.

Rifles to Brig. Wallis' East Brigade leaving the
Winnipeg Grenadiers with Lawson's West
Brigade. Maltby offered no explanation of this
decision which was in a sense necessitated by
his equally unexplained decision to divide the
island into two geographic sectors with the interbrigade boundary just east of the main northsouth road. Neither Brigadier was given effective
control of his forces as all units were assigned
to positions by Fortress Headquarters. Since
there was no wireless communication available,
command and control would depend upon
existing buried lines and hand carried messages.

In his official dispatch, Maltby states that
although he expected "the attack from across
the harbour because the route was short and
could be given full artillery protection" 46 he
would not "disregard a possible attack from
seaward" so he felt it necessary to position his
forces so as to cover every contingency. This
meant that the two Canadian battalions were
widely dispersed along the southern side of the
island leaving the two Indian battalions and the
HKVDC to cover an eight mile stretch of coast
including Victoria City, the docks and other builtup areas.

Japanese preparations for invading the
island were thorough if somewhat leisurely.
Artillery and air bombardment were directed at
vital points and especially against the pill boxes
on the north shore, more than half of which were
knocked out. After three days the Japanese again
sent a surrender demand under a flag of truce.
Maltby informed the War Office that the Japanese
envoys were " a p p a r e n t l y s u r p r i s e d and
disconcerted when proposal was summarily
rejected."46 The next evening after a further
intensification of air and artillery strikes on the
north coast the Japanese began their assault
crossing of the narrow waters.

The Japanese concentrated their assault on
a 4,000 yard front between North Point and
Aldrich Bay, the sector defended by the 5/7
Rajput battalion. Though the enemy took losses
in the crossing all six assault battalions quickly
overran the fixed defences. The entire weight of
the Japanese attack fell on the Rajputs who lost
most of their British and Indian officers in the
first few hours.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2001

Wallis had created an East Brigade reserve
by reinforcing "C" Company of the Royal Rifles
with a platoon from each of the other rifle
companies giving the Officer Commanding,
Major Wells Bishop, a force of 200 men. The
13
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These two photos show the extremely rugged terrain of Hong Kong. Above: A view looking to the northwest across
Repulse Bay. Visible is Castle Eucliffe directly behind the naval ship sitting in the Bay and the hotel set back from the
water just to the right of centre. Below: Colonel Tanaka, one of the Japanese commanders in 1941 looks across Aldrich
Bay to where his troops landed. This photo, taken in 1947 from Sai Wan Hill shows the town of Sau Ki Wan surrounding
the bay, while the lower slopes of Mount Parker are visible leading out of the top left corner of the photo.
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A postwar picture showing Canadian positions at the Wong Nei Chong Gap. The main north-south road which
bisects the island is visible running across the middle of the photo.

events of the night 1 8 / 1 9 December are
clouded by contradictory accounts as well as
the fog of war.47 'C Company first attempted to
regain the fort on Sai Wan Hill using two six
inch howitzers and several platoons. They
reached the fort but were unable to capture it.
Their War Diary reports that Chinese "coolies,"
or Japanese disguised in peasant clothing were
part of the force which occupied the fort.48
The War Diary also notes the disordered
retreat of elements of the Rajput battalion, some
of whom were without weapons. It makes clear
t h a t the c o u n t e r a t t a c k s m o u n t e d by "C"
Company during the hours of darkness were
uncoordinated and unsuccessful. By dawn on
19 December the Japanese had occupied Mount
Parker, Mount Butler, and Jardine's Lookout and
thus controlled the high ground in the northeast
corner of the island. 49
Fortress Headquarters was quite out of touch
with the situation insisting that relatively few
Japanese were ashore and ordering a general
counter-attack at daybreak on 19 December.
Since most of the Royal Rifle and Winnipeg
Grenadier companies were still in the coastal
positions these orders would be difficult to carry
out. Brigadier Lawson h a d located h i s
h e a d q u a r t e r s , and t h a t of the Winnipeg

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2001

Grenadiers, at Wong Nei Chong Gap which
dominated the main cross island road. From
there he could control both the south facing
companies on the coast as well as the Punjabs
and Royal Scots to the north. When 'D' Company
of the Grenadiers returned from the mainland
he positioned it to protect the gap facing north.
Unfortunately, the high ground to the east was
in Walks' sector and there was no tie-in with the
pill boxes on Jardines Lookout manned by the
HKVDC and Middlesex Regiment.50
Lieutenant-Colonel J.L.R. Sutcliffe, CO of the
Grenadiers, had organized his headquarters
company into three "flying columns" and it was
these platoon sized units which were ordered to
go to the relief of the men on Jardine's Lookout.
These brave attempts failed as the position was
firmly in Japanese hands. "A" Company of the
Grenadiers was brought north to reinforce this
thrust and was systematically destroyed by a well
organized enemy. "All officers, NCOs and men
were killed, wounded or taken prisoner," 51 so it
is difficult to reconstruct what happened in any
detail in this hastily improvised night attack. The
best information comes from witnesses who
provided information that led to the award of a
Victoria Cross to Company Sergeant Major J. R.
Osborn.52

15
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At first light it was the Japanese who were
on the move breaking into the gap from several
directions. Attempts to send reinforcements met
with disaster. 53 Lawson's headquarters were
overrun and at 1000 hours he informed Maltby
that the enemy was firing into the position at
point blank range and that he was "going outside
to fight it out."54 All that now stood in the way of
the J a p a n e s e were two p l a t o o n s of the
Grenadiers dug-in along the road. Their
courageous stand, which according to Japanese
accounts led to heavy Japanese casualties, 55
delayed the advance of 230th Regiment but the
229th succeeded in reaching Deep Water Bay
and splitting the island early on 20 December.
[See map Hong Kong: The Battle]
The Japanese advance in the East Brigade
sector was equally successful. By dawn on 19
December the Rajput battalion no longer existed
as an organized formation and Wallis decided
to withdraw his remaining forces to a secure
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base in the hope of being able to organize an
attack the next day. The Japanese pressed
forward seizing Violet Hill and the Hotel at
Repulse Bay. Wallis ordered the Royal Rifles to
recapture the hill and clear the coast road on
the morning of 20 December, a task well beyond
the capacity of infantry without artillery, not
to mention armoured support. "D" Company
was able to climb a "steep cliff up to a water
catchment" and work their way forward on the
slope of Violet Hill. They ambushed a Japanese
pack train and engaged other groups of the
enemy but were brought under fire from the
top of Violet Hill and forced to withdraw. 56
The next day, the 21st, found the Royals
in desperate circumstances. "A" Company was
holding ground at Repulse Bay, "C" Company,
reduced from a strength of 177 to 68, was at
Stanley Mound and the remaining companies
were under orders to prepare a new attack
towards the Wong Nei Chong Gap. "A" Company
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Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier) W.J. Home,
Commanding Officer of the Royal Rifles of Canada, was
the senior surviving Canadian officer at Hong Kong.

Company Sergeant-Major J.R. Osborn, "A" Company,
Winnipeg Grenadiers was killed in action on 19 December
1941 and posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross

of the Hong Kong Volunteers led the advance
which ended abruptly when Japanese troops
brought the leading troops under heavy fire. The
day was spent in a series of costly attempts to
stop the Japanese advance, including several
platoon-level actions, which temporarily
stabilized the front.57

that he persuaded Home to wait until morning
and told him he could not ignore Maltby. The
next morning Home was adamant, "he was more
than ever convinced of the futility of resistance."60

The situation in the western sector had also
continued to deteriorate and sometime on the
evening of 21 December Lieutenant-Colonel W.J.
Home, now the senior surviving Canadian officer,
spoke to Lieutenant-Colonel Sutcliffe, learning
that what was left of the Grenadiers were holding
the crest of Mount Cameron awaiting a Japanese
attack.
Lieut. Colonel Sutcliffe reported that his
battalion had been terribly decimated and also
that he had some argument with Higher
Command about useless attacks which his
regiment was ordered to make. He asked Brig.
Home if he could not do something to stop what
he considered a useless waste of lives.58

Home decided it was time to end the pointless
conflict and informed Brigadier Wallis that he
wished to see the Governor. According to Wallis,
Home stated that "his battalion was exhausted;
further resistance would only result in the waste
of valuable Canadian lives; as senior Canadian
officer he felt a grave responsibility. "59 Wallis says

Relations between the senior Canadian and
British officers were now poisoned by mutual
hostility and distrust and Wallis came to believe
Home was threatening a separate Canadian
surrender. The Canadian officers had long since
lost confidence in Wallis, Maltby and their staff
officers who seemed willing to sacrifice as many
men as necessary to ensure that the honour of
the g a r r i s o n a n d its c o m m a n d e r s w a s
maintained. As the Royals 2IC, Major (later
Brigadier) John H. Price put it:
There were plenty of Canadian officers who had
battle experience in the first war who were
competent to judge as to the possibility of a
successful outcome of the defence of the island.
Consider the facts - The Island had been split in
two by vastly superior Japanese forces. On the
eastern brigade front, which included the Stanley
Peninsula, the Royal Rifles and one company of
the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Force were the
only troops who had fought continuously day
and night, without rest, since the landing on the
17th and were still carrying all the fighting. By
the 21st they had been greatly reduced in fighting
strength and by the 23rd to a strength of around
500 all ranks. (It might be interesting to note
that when troops in this sector were marched
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A battle-damaged, bullet scarred building on a ridge overlooking Repulse Bay. Photographed in September 1945.

out of Stanley fort as Prisoners of War, they
numbered over 2000).
It required no great military genius to predict
the outcome of the battle once the Japanese had
landed on the island with their control of sea
and air and great superiority in weapons and
men. He felt, I think rightly, that he would be
derelict in his duty to his men and to the
Canadian Government if he did not
communicate his conclusions to the highest
authority. Also neither Home nor his officers had
any faith in Brig. Wallis' judgement or in his
conduct of operations. And who had better right
than he had? He and his men were bearing the
brunt of the fighting and knew from first hand
knowledge the strength and armament of the
forces against them. The Higher Command had
consistently shown an inability to grasp realities
of the situation and to pursue tactics which might
have prolonged the struggle but could not have
altered the final result.61

It may well be that Wallis had also lost confidence
in the direction of the campaign. He telephoned
Maltby on the morning of the 24th and was told
"you will not chuck it unless you run out of
ammunition, water or food. Do not TALK of
surrender. Put Col. Home in Hospital."62 The
confrontation ended with a decision to allow the
Royal Rifles 24 hours of rest which was to begin
on Christmas Eve. The rest lasted less than eight
hours for at 0230 hours on Christmas day the
battalion was ordered back to the front as "there

was a grave danger of a break through." 63
Lieutenant-Colonel Home was now close to
mutiny. He protested demands for a daylight
attack but when Wallis insisted, "D" Company,
without receiving the promised artillery support,
fought a battle which is said to have cost 26 killed
and 75 wounded. While this was taking place
Maltby and the Governor suddenly agreed to
capitulate. The news reached the Royals three
hours after the surrender when white flags began
to appear on government buildings.
The decision to surrender was apparently
the product of developments in the western
sector. On 21 December General Maltby's
communique to the War Office indicated that
resistance was almost at an end. According to
General Sir J o h n Kennedy, the Director of
Military Operations in London:
We had to decide whether to order the troops to
fight it out or give the Governor permission to
surrender as he wished to do... the psychological
aspect was of overriding importance, particularly
with an Oriental enemy. If we fought to the last
round and the last man at Hong Kong, we should
gain an indirect military advantage, in that the
Japanese would judge our powers of resistance
elsewhere by the same standard. Therefore my
opinion was that, although it was an unpleasant
decision, the garrison should be told to fight it
out.64
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wanted to find out just what the situation was,
what the enemy were doing, etc. So I fired my
"Very" pistol. This was the very first time I had
ever fired one. I got the angle slightly too high
and lit up my own position and the surrounding
country as well as the enemy's position and
caused a hell of a commotion. At that time I had
spent five years in the Mlitia, and had been on
active service two years. This is the kind of
training Canada gives her soldiers. If no other
lesson is learned from our fiasco than this, it
would be well worth the cost, in the efficiency of
future Canadian Armies.66

The Prime Minister was informed and sent a
typically Churchillian message insisting "there
must be no thought of surrender...the enemy
must be compelled to expend the utmost life and
equipment. There must be vigorous fighting in
the inner defences, and, if need be, from house
to house. Every day that you are able to maintain
your resistance will help the Allied cause..." 65
The Governor and his military commander
had little choice except to agree. As late as the
morning of 25 December the official line
contained no hint of surrender. The Governor's
Christmas Message urged everyone to "fight on.
Hold fast for King and Empire." Maltby joined
him declaring the Order of the Day is to hold
fast. These words meant little, by the afternoon
it was apparent the Japanese would soon be in
Victoria city. At 1500 hours the order to ceasefire was issued. After all the heroic rhetoric
surrender came as soon as the Japanese got near
Fortress Headquarters. Almost 2,000 men had
been killed or died of wounds including 300
Canadians. The rest would spend the balance
of the war in prison camps.
The decision to reinforce Hong Kong and the
defeat of its garrison will continue to be a subject
of both controversy and recrimination. The
Canadian troops sent to Hong Kong were
grievously handicapped by their lack of training,
poor equipment and shortages of ammunition.
They were poorly served by t h e i r own
government which had for so long avoided
spending the sums of money necessary to
prepare the Canadian forces for a global war
which Canadian public opinion would demand
that they fight. Their lives were also endangered
by Churchill and his Cabinet who were prepared
to sacrifice British and Commonwealth forces
in the Far East rather than jeopardize hopes of
a major victory in North Africa.
An officer who served with the Winnipeg
Grenadiers reflected on the situation in a postwar diary and his observations are worth
quoting:
Only one consolation that I can think of and that
is, if we had been better trained and fought better,
we should unquestionably have sustained many
more casualties. At least every one of us would
have fought with some understanding of what it
was all about and with some ability to properly
defend ourselves. When on Mt. Cameron at night
the Japs suddenly attacked our position, I

Before we judge the army of 1941 too harshly
It may be worthwhile to ask if the government of
C a n a d a would s e n d t r o o p s who were
inadequately equipped and trained for the task
assigned to them into harms way today? We may
also wish to discuss whether Canadian forces
might again come under the orders of officers
of limited competence in circumstances when
the command and control function is deeply
flawed? If we are certain that such situations
will never exist again then we can congratulate
ourselves, the lessons of Hong Kong and a host
of other imperfect military operations have been
learned, at least until the next international crisis
explodes out of control.
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